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Proposals for tax cuts on cultural goods represent an ongoing debate in cultural 
policy. The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on this debate using 
microsimulation tools.  First, we have estimated an Almost Ideal Demand System for 
nineteen different groups of goods, including cultural goods. Expenditure and price 
elasticities have been obtained from this model. Using this information, three alternatives 
cuts in the V.A.T. rate on cultural goods have been microsimulated and evaluated in terms 
of revenue and welfare. These types of fiscal reforms will lead to welfare and efficiency 
gains that can be described as regressive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally, tax policies that favour cultural goods are justified by their classification 
as  merit goods, according to Musgrave's definition (1959). Although this is somewhat 
controversial, government intervention in the provision and funding of these goods is also 
based on the potential existence of external economies and information asymmetries. In 
any case, and despite these normative considerations, government policies for the 
promotion of culture should be evaluated to ensure that well-informed decisions are taken. 
 
 
  Far from being a purely academic exercise, this is an ongoing issue in debates on 
cultural policy, as demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the removal of the zero-
rate VAT on books in Mexico, the proposal by ministers of the European Union (EU) 
Audiovisual Policy Unit to harmonise VAT on books and audiovisual media or the 
petition, signed by European pop artists, for a cut in the value added tax on CDs in order 
to give music the same tax treatment as books, newspapers or cinema tickets, which are 
subject to lower tax rates. In this context, the European Commission presented a Directive 
proposal with a new list of goods and services which would benefit from a reduced rate of 
VAT. This measure would specifically affect theatre and cinema tickets, as well as books, 
newspapers and magazines. This tax cut will depend on the arrangements to be made by 
the economics ministers of the EU in the near future. 
 
 
  Tax cut proposals like those described above are generally made without taking into 
account all their economic effects. That is to say, they generally lack the support provided 
by empirical evidence. This justifies their approval. Fortunately, economists have a series of 
different tools at their disposal which allow the effects of such proposals to be determined. 
One of these tools is microsimulation, which enables the assessment of fiscal reforms even 
before they are passed by the Parliament. These techniques are increasingly used in 
developed countries, though up to now they have scarcely been used in the economics of 
culture (see Merz, 1991; O’Donoghue, 2001).  
 
The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on this debate using 
microsimulation tools to analyse the expected demand shifts and their effects on 
consumers’ welfare. This type of analysis will show that there are some caveats which must   3
be taken into account when implementing these kinds of fiscal reforms. In order to meet 
this objective, our first step will be to analyse consumers’ revealed preferences. Thus, we 
will assess own-price elasticities, cross-elasticities and expenditure elasticities of nineteen 
different groups of consumer goods including cultural ones. This will allow us to analyse 
rarely studied issues in the economics literature such as how consumers’ consumption of 
cultural goods responds to price or income changes, as well as the complementary or 
substitute nature of the different cultural goods. This kind of empirical analysis is 
uncommon. Nevertheless, from an economic perspective it is crucial to understand the 
demand patterns of cultural goods and the effectiveness of public policies which support 
these goods and services. 
 
With this in mind, three alternatives for reforming the indirect tax on cultural goods 
will be evaluated. The analysis will be carried out using a microsimulation of these three 
possible tax reforms and the results will help us identify the most likely effects of a tax cut 
on cultural goods. Specifically, we will try to quantify the impact on revenue as well as the 
effects of the suggested reform proposals on social and individual welfare. Moreover, the 
microsimulation exercises will allow us to determine how the gains (and eventual losses) 
from these tax cuts will be distributed and who will benefit from them. In other words, this 
microsimulation exercise will enable us to ascertain whether a tax cut on cultural goods is 
actually desirable from an economic point of view, based on an assessment of public sector 
revenue losses and consumer gains. 
 
The econometric basis for these simulations is the estimation of an Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muelbauer (1980a, 1980b), which lets us 
control for all cross-effects generated by price or real income changes. The data set used to 
estimate this model is the Spanish Continuous Survey of Household Expenditure (ECPF)
1. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: the second section will describe the indirect 
taxation on cultural goods in Spain, as well as the simulated reforms; the third one will set 
out the complete demand model used, the fourth one, the demand system estimated, the 
fifth one will present the tax reform estimation of the microsimulation results and the last 
section will summarise the main conclusions. 
                                                 
1 This survey has a panel structure and it is currently used in international studies (see, for instance, Browning 
and Collado, 2001).    4
 
 
II. TAXATION OF CULTURAL GOODS IN SPAIN: CURRENT SITUATION AND SIMULATED 
REFORMS 
 
In Spain, as in other European Union countries, indirect taxation on consumption 
generally comprises Value Added Tax (VAT) and the different excise duties imposed on 
specific consumer goods such as spirits, beer, hydrocarbons, tobacco, electricity and vehicle 
registration. Of these, VAT is the only one which affects cultural goods and services (i.e. 
there are no excise duties to be paid on such goods and services). However, the tax rates 
levied on these goods differ across product categories. VAT on records, films and 
audiovisual media is currently set at a minimum of 15% throughout Europe and in some 
countries is as high as 25%. On the other hand, other cultural goods such as books and 
newspapers are subject to rates as low as 4%. 
 
Table I summarizes the VAT rate currently imposed on cultural goods and services 
in Spain within the European Union VAT system. As the table shows, VAT is levied at 7%  
on cinema, theatre, concerts, ballet, museum tickets, and admission to botanic gardens and 
sporting events such as football games; at 4% on books, magazines and newspapers   
(although text books are not included in this item, they are taxed at 4%); and at 16% on 
records, cassettes, video tapes (blank or film) and audiovisual media. This information 
provides the initial scenario for this paper. As can be seen, there is a wide range of tax 
rates, and there is no zero-rate tax or exemption. Three reforms of this regime are 
simulated. The first reform analyses the application of a uniform tax rate of 4% on all 
cultural goods and services (reform A); the second reform proposes a broad zero rate 
(reform B); and the third reform simulates reducing the tax imposed on these goods to the 
rate immediately below the one in the initial regime (reform C). Reform A could be 
considered as being equivalent to the European pop artists’ proposal to establish a unique 
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III. A COMPLETE DEMAND SYSTEM: DATA AND ESTIMATION PROCESS 
 
The database used is the Spanish Continuous Survey of Household Expenditure 
(ECPF). The ECPF is a panel run by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
This survey provides quarterly and annual information on household incomes and 
consumption, including own-consumption, own-supply and payment in kind. The Survey is 
targeted at 3,200 families chosen by sampling techniques and one eighth of the sample is 
renewed each quarter. It also includes exhaustive information on household characteristics 
such as employment status, demographics, and so on. 
 
In accordance with the level of disaggregation permitted by this survey and the 
availability of consumer price indexes, nineteen expenditure groups were considered, three 
of which were cultural goods
2. The first group consists of admission to cinemas, theatres, 
museums and other cultural events. The second group covers books, magazines and 
newspapers and the third group includes film and music on magnetic media.  
 
The empirical study is made up of two phases: an estimation phase and a simulation 
phase. The first phase generates the price elasticity and expenditure elasticity matrix using 
                                                 
2 The goods are grouped as follows: 1. Food and non-alcoholic drinks. 2 Alcoholic drinks. 3 Tobacco. 4 
Clothing and footwear. 5 Household goods. 6 Furniture and household services. 7 Gas and fuel. 8 Medical 
and pharmaceutical products and services. 9 Fuels. 10 Private transport services. 11 Public transport. 12 
Communications 13 Leisure, entertainment and holidays. 14 Education. 15 Cinema, theatre, museum and 
other events. 16 Books, magazines and newspapers. 17 Film and music on magnetic media 18 Consumer 
durables. 19 Other goods. 
   6
ECPF data corresponding to the period 1985 (third quarter) to 1995 (fourth quarter). Using 
these results, the second phase then simulates the effects of a tax reform, taking the 1998 
ECPF data as a reference. 
 
The model used in this paper assumes firstly that consumers divide their total income 
between savings and durable and non-durable goods. Subsequently, income allocated to 
durable and non-durable goods is divided between different types of goods (e.g. Blundell, 
1988). In practice, the model assumes expenditure on these goods is separable within total 
expenditure. Changes in consumer behaviour are taken into account by restructuring the 
composition of the household shopping basket, maintaining real consumer expenditure 
constant in the scenarios considered. That is, we assume that the spending and saving 
patterns of the economic agents remain constant over time. 
 
The model used in the estimation phase is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a and 1980b). The main attraction of AIDS is 









iht ht i jt ij ih iht y p a w ε β γ     (1) 
 
Subscripts i, h and t refer respectively to the type of goods, household and time. The 
variable  iht w  defines the share of the total expenditure which good i represents in 
household h during period t. The variables p and y represent the price and real expenditure 
respectively, the latter being used as a proxy of real income. 
 
Parameters  a,  γ ,  β  were estimated by imposing zero-degree homogeneity 
constraints on prices and income –(expressions (2), (3) and (4)) and symmetry constraints 
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iht w                    (6)  
 
Parameter a is modelled using a series of dummies which allow households to be 
categorized by home tenure, alcohol and tobacco consumption, education, size of town of 
residence, employment status (active or inactive) and employment category. The model is 
estimated under the assumption that individuals will alter their expenditure decisions as a 
result of the price changes generated by the simulated reforms. Hence, the share that each 
good has in the total expenditure,  i w , has to be predicted and adjusted by the prediction 
error, ε , where  i i i Y w ε β ˆ ˆ + = . 
 
The expenditure on each good depends not only on the price of the good itself but 
also on the price of other goods, which requires that the complementarity and 
substitutability relationships between those goods be modelled explicitly. It should be 
noted that we implicitly assume that the producer prices do not change; it is the price to the 
consumer that is modified by the tax reforms and variations in the demand quantities do 
not affect producer prices. Hence, our welfare analysis is focus on the consumer surplus 
changes assuming that producer surplus does not vary with the VAT rates modifications. 
Real expenditure is obtained from the expenditure on all goods deflated by the Stone 
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Given that the AIDS is made up of a system of dependent linear equations, n-1 
equations of the system have been estimated, where we exclude the equation 
corresponding to consumer durables. The parameter values of the equation that is omitted 
in the estimation have been obtained using equations (2) to (6). 
 
Infrequent purchases and seasonal variation are among the main econometric 
problems with this type of data. To avoid the first problem, the model has been estimated 
following the procedure proposed by Baker, Mckay and Simons (1990), which consists of 
using instrumental variables in a three-stage least squares estimation procedure. Seasonal 
variation, on the other hand, is corrected by including a variable which takes account of the 
trend of the series, and by introducing a dummy variable for each quarter of the series (the 
variable which corresponds to the fourth quarter is omitted in the estimation). 
 
IV. DEMAND SYSTEM ESTIMATION 
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where δ ij = 1, if i = j  and 0 in all other cases.  
 
The estimated expenditure elasticities and the Marshallian own-price elasticities are 
presented in Table II and Table III. As may be seen, all goods are observed to have a 
positive expenditure elasticity that is to say, none of the categories are inferior. This 
outcome is to be expected, since the items of expenditure considered in the equations are 
of an aggregated nature and while it may be the case that a specific good is inferior, it is 
unlikely that this would be the case for an entire category of goods. However, several 
expenditure groups are defined as necessities since their expenditure elasticity is less than 
one (including food, as might be expected). Conversely, the three groups of cultural goods 
considered here conform to the profile of luxuries since their expenditure elasticity is 
greater than one, particularly so in the case of cinema, theatre and other shows. This means   9
that the consumption of cultural goods is very sensitive to an income increase and, by 
extension, to the economic cycle. For instance, in the case of expenditure on cinemas, 
theatres and other entertainments, the estimated average value of price elasticities shows 
that a 1% increase (decrease) in households income will generate a 1.75% increase 
(decrease) in expenditure on these goods. 
  
The own-price elasticities have the expected sign for cinema, theatre and other 
entertainments (group 15) and books, newspapers and magazines (group 16). The results 
show that demand for these goods is very sensitive to price changes, particularly in the case 
of group 16. In both cases, a 1% price decrease will generate a proportionally greater 
increase in the consumption of such goods of more than 1%. Similar results for the 
Spanish case have been found by SGAE (2002) and Fernández et al (2002). These studies 
show that price increases discourage attendance at cinema, theatre and other 
entertainments by non-regular spectators, whereas regular spectators maintain a similar 
level of expenditure and thus continue to attend these events, although lees frequently. 
 
The furniture and household services group and the record and film group are the 
only two with positive estimated price elasticities.  However, it can be seen in Table III that 
these elasticities are negative for at least the last ten percentiles. Since the value zero is 
included in any two-tailed confidence interval for the standard confidence levels, it can be 
argued that the elasticity of such goods is not significantly different from zero. Finally, the 
goods analysed all had inelastic demands with the exception of private transport, cinema, 
theatre, other events and books and newspapers. Consequently, we can expect more than 
proportional changes in the consumption of these cultural goods as a reaction to 




Expenditure elasticities, by group of goods 
 






1.  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.63  0.78  0.85 
2.  Alcoholic beverages  0.66  0.86  0.95 
3.  Tobacco  0.81  0.91  0.95 
4.  Clothing and footwear  1.14  1.07  1.04 
5.  Housing  0.79  0.88  0.92 
6.  Furniture and household equipment  0.94  0.97  0.98 
7.  Gas and fuel  0.69  0.85  0.93 
8.  Medical and pharmaceutical products and services 1.06  1.03  1.01   10
9.  Fuel  1.25  1.13  1.07 
10. Private transport services  1.20  1.09  1.05 
11. Public transport  1.01  1.01  1.00 
12.  Communications  0.86 0.92 0.96 
13. Leisure, entertainment and holidays  1.40  1.20  1.13 
14.  Education  1.30 1.11 1.05 
15. Cinema, theatre, museum, etc...  1.75  1.31  1.11 
16. Books, periodicals and newspapers  1.37  1.17  1.08 
17. Music and film on magnetic media.  1.24  1.09  1.03 
18. Consumer durables  1.48  1.17  1.06 
19. Other goods not listed above  1.27  1.14  1.04 





Own-price elasticities, by group of goods 
 







1.  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  -0.24  -0.51  -0.65 
2.  Alcoholic beverages  -0.19  -0.66  -0.87 
3.  Tobacco  -0.91  -0.95  -0.97 
4.  Clothing and footwear  -0.69  -0.85  -0.92 
5.  Housing  -0.83  -0.88  -0.90 
6.  Furniture and household equipment  0.45  -0.13  -0.57 
7.  Gas and fuel  -0.52  -0.76  -0.89 
8.  Medical and pharmaceutical products and services  -0.78  -0.91  -0.96 
9.  Fuel  -0.81  -0.91  -0.95 
10. Private transport services  -2.05  -1.49  -1.24 
11. Public transport  -0.83  -0.93  -0.97 
12.  Communications  -0.95 -0.97 -0.98 
13. Leisure, entertainment and holidays  -0.56  -0.80  -0.89 
14.  Education  -0.04 -0.64 -0.85 
15. Cinema, theatre, museum, etc...  -1.23  -1.10  -1.04 
16. Books, magazines and newspapers  -1.65  -1.30  -1.14 
17. Music and film on magnetic media.  0.65  -0.36  -0.77 
18. Consumer durables  -1.43  -1.18  -1.09 
19. Other goods not listed above   6.20  2.58  0.05 







Table IV lists the cross elasticities between the nineteen groups of goods and the 
cultural goods considered here. For substitute goods, the cross elasticity has to be positive. 
Complementary goods, on the other hand, have a negative cross elasticity. Apart from the 
residual category 19, the main complementarity and substitutability relations arise among 
the cultural goods themselves. In particular, going to the cinema and other shows is 
complementary to the purchase of books, newspapers and magazines and substitutable to 
the acquisition of records and films. These relationships, estimated from cross elasticities,   11
indicate the direction of the expected changes for other non-cultural goods after the 
reforms analysed here took place.  
 
Table IV 











1.  Food and beverages  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001 
2.  Alcoholic beverages  0.093  0.631  0.374 
3.  Tobacco  0.034  -0.006  -0.023 
4.  Clothing and footwear  -0.098  -0.191  -0.051 
5.  Housing.  -0.004  -0.036  0.017 
6.  Furniture and household equipment  -0.144  -0.048  -0.148 
7.  Gas and fuel  -0.012  -0.259  0.133 
8.  Medical and pharmaceutical products and services -0.131  0.053  -0.056 
9.  Fuel  0.078  0.062  -0.048 
10. Private transport services  0.260  0.242  -0.040 
11. Public transport  -0.168  -0.186  -0.142 
12. Communications  -0.136  0.163  -0.018 
13. Leisure, entertainment and holidays  -0.053  0.041  -0.055 
14. Education  -0.058  0.380  0.155 
15. Cinema, theatre and shows  -1.228  -0.718  0.711 
16. Books, newspapers and magazines  -0.524  -1.648  -0.331 
17. Records and films  1.329  -0.840  0.650 
18. Consumer durables  0.329  0.076  -0.171 
19. Other goods not listed above  -0.038  0.133  1.180 
 
 
After the estimation phase had been completed, the proposed tax reforms were 















is approximately the VAT rate change and  j i ij = =   if 1 δ and 0 
otherwise. It can be observed from equation (10) that an inelastic good will find its share 
reduced – although its demand will increase - if its price decreases. On the other hand, if 
own-price elasticity is higher than one (in absolute values) both the share and quantity 
demanded will increase where there is a price reduction. Furthermore, the shares of total 
expenditure of complementary goods will increase when prices decrease because of tax 
cuts, but the shares of substitutes will be reduced. 
   12
Table V shows the changes in the shopping basket induced by the simulated reforms, 
using the consumption behaviour implicit in the AIDS model. Such changes in the shares 
of each group of goods within total expenditure are a direct consequence of the own and 




Breakdown of total expenditure by expenditure groups  
Expenditure group  Initial 
scenario 
Reform A Reform B  Reform C
1.  Food and non-alcoholic beverages  0.2016  0.2018  0.2017  0.2017 
2.  Alcoholic beverages  0.0076  0.0069  0.0071  0.0072 
3.  Tobacco  0.0197  0.0197  0.0197  0.0197 
4.  Clothing and footwear  0.0738  0.0755  0.0749  0.0744 
5.  Housing  0.2347  0.2346  0.2348  0.2343 
6.  Furniture and household equipment  0.0900  0.0930  0.0916  0.0918 
7.  Gas and fuel  0.0147  0.0146  0.0147  0.0145 
8.  Medical and pharmaceutical products and services 0.0279  0.0284  0.0281  0.0282 
9.  Fuel  0.0359  0.0359  0.0359  0.0360 
10. Private transport services  0.0262  0.0256  0.0258  0.0261 
11. Public transport  0.0088  0.0094  0.0092  0.0091 
12.  Communications  0.0211 0.0212 0.0211 0.0212 
13. Leisure, entertainment and holidays  0.1266  0.1279  0.1271  0.1275 
14.  Education  0.0162 0.0157 0.0158 0.0160 
15. Cinema, theatre, museum, etc...  0.0030  0.0029  0.0030  0.0028 
16. Books, magazines and newspapers  0.0064  0.0075  0.0071  0.0069 
17. Music and film on magnetic media.  0.0018  0.0014  0.0016  0.0015 
18. Consumer durables  0.0652  0.0651  0.0652  0.0659 




Since books and newspapers have an elastic demand and are complementary with 
respect to cinema tickets and music and film recordings, these proposed reforms must lead 
unambiguously to an increment in their share, as shown in Table V. Furthermore, given 
our estimates, we may expect reductions in cinema, theatre and museum tickets and music 
and film on magnetic media shares since their demands are less elastic and they present two 




V. MICROSIMULATED DISTRIBUTIVE AND WELFARE RESULTS 
 
Having microsimulated the proposed reforms, in this section we analyse the 
distributive and welfare outcomes. First, it should be pointed out that the overall decline in 
tax revenue implied by these reforms is not very large: 0.02% for A, 0.54% for B and   13
0.41% for C. Obviously, B is the most radical reform since it implies abolishing VAT for 
cultural goods. A and C, however, are partial reforms, with C being more important as 
book and newspapers have the highest budget shares among cultural goods and this reform 
involves a reduction in its VAT rate whereas under A it remains unchanged. This small 
revenue impact is closely linked to the low weighting of cultural goods in household 
budgets (1.12%) and the cross effects that will shift the demand for other goods. As shown 
in Table VI, even though the consumption of cultural goods is not subject to any excise 
duty, excise revenue is altered slightly as a result of the reassignments induced by the 




Percentage change in tax revenue with respect to the initial scenario  
 
  Reform A  Reform B  Reform C 
VAT  -0.154 -0.770 -0.592 
Excise duties  0.258 -0.074 -0.040 
Total -0.020  -0.544  -0.413 
Note: Population values 
 
 
Given that the revenue effects of the three reforms are very small, at first sight this 
would appear to be argument in favour of their application. However, the tax reforms 
studied here cannot be justified on the sole basis of this condition. 
 
Together with revenue aspects, a through assessment of such reforms requires 
consideration of three other crucial issues. Firstly, it is necessary to calculate to what extent 
reforms affect the distribution of expenditure. Secondly, the effect on individual well-being 
and social welfare must be assessed. Finally, it is appropriate to identify the characteristics 
of the households benefiting most from these measures. This set of results enables a cost-
benefit analysis of the reforms to be made. 
 
As regards the first issue mentioned above, the decrease in indirect tax revenue is not 
equally distributed. In fact, the reforms considered here slightly increase inequality, as 
shown in the Gini indices in Table VII. This increase in the Gini index, though small, is 
greatest when all cultural goods are zero-rated (Reform B).  
   14
 
Table VII 
Distribution, progressiveness and redistribution indices 
 
  Pre-reform  Reform A  Reform B  Reform C 
Gini indices 
Gross expenditure   0.3178291  --  --  -- 
Net  expenditure  0.3135603 0.3136195 0.3136896 0.3136451 
Reynolds-Smolensky redistribution index 
Net expenditure  0.0042689  0.0042096  0.0041395  0.041840 
Average rate 
Average  rate  11.52936% 11.52705% 11.46715% 11.48386% 
Kakwani progressiveness index 
Net  expenditure  0.0375026 0.0370591 0.0367393 0.0370179 
Note: Population values 
 
 
In addition, the reforms considered here impair the redistributive capacity of indirect 
taxation, as evidenced by the Reynolds-Smolensky index in Table VII. This is due to the 
loss of revenue arising from such measures and the loss of progressiveness of indirect 
taxation (computed via the Kakwani index). The low revenue impact observed in Table VI 
is corroborated by the narrow changes in the average rates shown in Table VII. 
Nevertheless, the reforms considered here barely change the distribution of effective 








The positive slope of this figure is related to the fact that luxury goods usually have 
higher VAT rates, and therefore the higher the income the higher the effective average tax 
rate. 
 
In short, the simulated reforms scarcely have any distributive impact, although they 
do produce a very slight increase in the inequality of the expenditure distribution and they 
reduce the redistributive capacity and progressiveness of the indirect taxes. Overall, a 
reduction in the taxation on the consumption of cultural goods and services benefits the 
population that spends most on those goods. This result is closely linked to the high   15
concentration of consumption on this type of good in the uppermost deciles of 








The effects of the reforms on individual well-being may be studied using two 
approaches. The first of these is to assess the reform just after its introduction (static 
monetary variation). Here it is assumed that, in the short term, households do not modify 
their behaviour in response to fiscal parameter changes. In the second approach, individual 
well-being is assessed using Hick’s Equivalent Variation (1939) and King Equivalent 
Expenditure, which assume that households reallocate expenditure where relative prices 
change. 
 
The results in Table VIII show that, on average, the reforms considered produce 
welfare gains in the short and the long term. Three aspects must be stressed. On the one 
hand, welfare gains are substantially greater if we take household behaviour into account. 
On the other hand, and as may be expected, the highest gains arise when the cultural goods 
are zero-rated (Reform B), whereas the reform which generates the least gain in welfare is 
the reduction to a uniform 4% VAT rate (Reform A). Finally, average welfare gains are not 
significant in absolute terms, and represent a small percentage of the average household’s 
spending. In relative terms, the gains are limited but not insignificant, particularly in the 
long term. For instance, the price of a cinema ticket was about 5 euros in Spain in 1998, so 
in comparative terms Reform A would generate a welfare gain equivalent to attendance at 
eight additional films a year or to the purchase of two or three CDs. If VAT were 
eliminated on cultural goods (Reform B), welfare gains would be as high as the purchase of 
fifteen extra cinema tickets or  four additional CDs. However, these gains would be 
distributed among all goods categories, as shown in Table V, and the demand for cultural 
good would barely change. 
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Table VIII 
Mean variation in household welfare and efficiency  
(Euros / year) 
 
  Reform A  Reform B  Reform C 
Expenditure   17,639.83 
Initial equivalent expenditure  17,603.1  17,565.0  17,591.5 
Final equivalent expenditure   17,676.6  17,715.0  17,688.2 
Static monetary variation  6.2  14.7  9.9 
Equivalent variation  36.8  75.2  48.4 
Note: Population values 
 
 Nevertheless, these results show that on average, the reforms would increase 
households’ well-being. However, the differences observed in Figure 2 in the consumption 
of cultural goods make it appropriate to study how gains are distributed in terms of 
economic and social-economic variables. As a starting point, Table IX contains the 
distribution of such gains by expenditure deciles using the equivalent variation. The results 
clearly indicate that welfare gains rise with expenditure, that is, whatever tax reform is 
implemented, a decrease in VAT on cultural goods benefits high-income households more. 
Even more, the welfare gains of the households from the uppermost decile are 10 times 




Distributive analysis of welfare 
Equivalent Variation 
Decile  Reform A  Reform B  Reform C 
1 9.9  19.3  12.7 
2  16.8 33.5 21.9 
3  22.2 44.5 29.0 
4  27.4 55.2 35.9 
5  32.6 66.0 42.7 
6  38.4 78.0 50.4 
7  45.2 92.2 59.5 
8  54.5 11.6 71.8 
9 69.1  142.3  91.2 
10  110.0 228.9 145.9 
Average  36.8 75.2 48.4 
Note: Population values  
 
 
  An analysis of the distribution of equivalent variation has also been carried out 
taking different socio-economic variables into account. The results are shown in Table X. 
Firstly, it can be seen that welfare gains are closely associated with the level of studies and   17
the economic situation of the head of the family. In particular, where university studies 
have been taken, welfare gains are twice as high as those where studies are at a primary 
school level. This result corroborates those reported in the CIMEC (1999) study, where 
there is a very high correlation between attendance at theatres, cinemas and other stage arts 
and the educational level and standard of living of the audience. Secondly, welfare gains 
depend, as expected, on the economic situation of households. The households most 
benefitting from a tax reduction on cultural goods are those where the principal earner is 
working, and their gains are far greater than those where the principal earner is unemployed 
or retired. Thirdly, reforms are more favourable for households made up of couples rather 
than one individual, especially when the individual in question is older than 65. This result 
will partly depend on scale economies in two-earner couples. Thus, the ability to pay again 
plays a central role in the distribution of welfare gains. Finally, the results show that the 
greatest welfare gains arise where individuals live in big cities where cultural availability 




Breakdown of the equivalent variation by social-economic variables 
Households
% 
Reform A  Reform B  Reform C 
1. Educational Level 
Tertiary Education  16.3 57.5  118.6  76.0
Secondary Education  12.8 45.4  93.0  59.8
Primary Education  70.9 30.5  61.9  40.0
2. Economic Situation 
On Work  59.6 43.7  89.6  57.6
Unemployed   3.8 27.9  56.5  36.6
Retired 29.4 27.6  56.0  36.2
Unfit for Work/not Working  7.1 21.6  43.6  28.3
Student or on Military Service  0.0 17.6  35.2  23.0
3. Households Composition  
Couple with three or more children under 16  11.3 41.3  84.5  54.4
Father/mother or couple with at least a son/daughter older 
than 16 
2.2 40.4 82.8  53.3
Couples with two children under 16  8.9 38.0  77.5  49.9
Couples with one child under 16  7.0 34.0  69.3  44.7
Couples without children, with a member older than 65  1.7 27.9  56.5  36.5
Couples without children, with a member under 65  9.9 22.6  45.6  29.6
An individual, between 30 and 64 of age  3.7 21.6  43.6  28.3
An individual, under 30   0.3 21.6  43.5  28.2
An individual, 65 years old or more   6.2 13.7  27.3  17.8
Other households with all their members related to the 
family 
35.2 44.3 90.9  58.4
Other households with one or more members not related  13.3 40.1  82.0  52.8  18
to the family 
Other households  0.3 36.2  73.8  47.6
4. Size of the residence town  
Town, capital of a province  35.3 42.3  86.7  55.7
Town not a capital with more than 100000 inhabitants.  8.6 36.9  75.3  48.5
Town not a capital with a population between 50000 and 
100000 inhabitants. 
7.3 37.4 76.4  49.2
Town not a capital with a population between 20000 and 
50000 inhabitants. 
12.3 36.4 74.3  47.9
Town not a capital with a population between 10000 and 
20000 inhabitants. 
10.4 33.7 68.7  44.3




Supplementary to the analysis of individual well-being, we also study the effects of 
these three reforms on social welfare. Table XI shows the results for the Atkinson indices 
and King’s lambda for different values of the inequality aversion parameter. These results 
show gains – albeit small – in social welfare. The reform that produces the greatest gains 




Atkinson index & King’s lambda 
 















0  0.000  0.000 1.009 0.000  1.012 0.000 1.006 
0.5  0.081  0.081 1.009 0.081  1.011 0.081 1.006 
1  0.159  0.159 1.008 0.160  1.011 0.160 1.005 
1.5  0.235  0.235 1.008 0.235  1.011 0.235 1.005 
2  0.308  0.343 1.008 0.307  1.011 0.308 1.005 
2.5  0.378  0.378 1.008 0.377  1.011 0.378 1.005 
3  0.444  0.444 1.008 0.444  1.011 0.444 1.005 




Finally, Table XII shows that the tax reforms simulated here produce gains in 
efficiency. On average, reform B is the one which results in the greatest efficiency gains, 
with an improvement of 0.0225 euros per euro of additional revenue. 
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Table XII 
Efficiency analysis   
  Equivalent deadweight loss  
() E Ed  
Relative change in efficiency  
1 / R EdE  
Decile  Reform A Reform B Reform C Reform A Reform B Reform C 
1  -10.32 -17.74 -11.45  -0.01900  -0.03400  -0.02200 
2  -16.49 -28.53 -18.25  -0.01500  -0.02700  -0.01700 
3  -20.67 -35.75 -22.61  -0.01300  -0.02300  -0.01500 
4  -24.17 -41.54 -26.27  -0.01200  -0.02100  -0.01300 
5  -28.04 -48.69 -30.52  -0.01200  -0.02100  -0.01300 
6  -33.35 -57.87 -36.01  -0.01200  -0.02100  -0.01300 
7  -38.00 -66.65 -41.73  -0.01100  -0.01900  -0.01200 
8  -44.76 -78.79 -49.16  -0.01100  -0.01900  -0.01200 
9  -57.01  -101.28  -62.61  -0.01100 -0.02000 -0.01200 
10  -90.86  -165.65  -102.51  -0.01100 -0.02000 -0.01200 
Mean  -30.53 -52.71 -32.96  -0.0127  -0.0225  -0.01410 





VI. FINAL  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper used the Spanish Continuous Survey of Household Expenditure (ECPF) 
to estimate an AIDS model with a total of nineteen expenditure groups. These groups 
include three types of cultural goods: (i) cinemas, theatres, museums, etc, (ii) books, 
magazines and newspapers, and (iii) music and films on magnetic media. The relevance of 
this exercise lies in the fact that it is one of the first attempts to estimate a complete 
demand system explicitly taking into account cultural goods demand. 
 
From this demand model, the effects of three tax reforms were simulated, where 
each reform involved a reduction in the indirect taxation on cultural goods. Reform A 
consisted of applying a low VAT rate (4%) to the consumption of all cultural goods and 
services. Reform B consisted of zero-rating cultural goods, i.e. the total elimination of 
indirect taxation on culture. Reform C reduced the tax to the rate immediately below the 
one originally in force. 
 
Econometric estimation of the AIDS model provided the price and expenditure 
elasticities of the various categories of goods. It is noteworthy that cultural goods and 
services are all luxury goods since their expenditure elasticities are greater than one in all   20
cases. Moreover, the demand for cinemas, theatres and other events has the largest average 
expenditure elasticity: 1.721.Cinemas, theatres and other events and books and newspapers 
also respond more than proportionally to price changes, since their own-price elasticities 
are greater than one, in absolute terms. Moreover, the most important complementarity 
and substitutability relations are observed among cultural goods. In particular, admissions 
to the cinema and other shows are complements of books, newspapers and magazines and 
substitutes of records and films.  
 
With regard to distributive and revenue effects on welfare, the proposed reforms 
produce small declines in tax revenue: 0.020% for Reform A, 0.53% for Reform B and 
0.39% for Reform C. The simulated changes most affect all expenditure groups because of 
the cross effects.  
 
As for the distributive effects, the reforms considered here slightly increase 
expenditure distribution inequality. Moreover, they also reduce the redistributive capacity 
and the progressiveness of indirect taxes (although the difference is practically negligible) 
because the consumption of this type of good is directly related to the households 
purchasing power. 
 
Since all the reforms involve tax cuts, the reforms studied bring about welfare gains. 
However, these welfare gains are positively related to the ability to pay, the economic 
situation and the educational level of a household. This result allows us to qualify the 
distributive aspects of this type of reform in that people with a lower cultural level, and 
who should thus be the primary target of cultural policies, are the least benefitted group 
when such policies are exclusively of a fiscal type. In addition, the reforms studied produce 
efficiency gains. Finally, and as expected, these reforms bring social welfare and efficiency 
gains which increase with the magnitude of the tax cut.  
 
  Summing up, this research shows that tax cuts on cultural goods and services will 
lead to welfare and efficiency increases but that these gains are not equally distributed. 
Moreover, this policy can be described as regressive, since these goods have income 
elasticities greater than one. Consequently, the richer a household is, the larger the welfare 
gains are. In conclusion, policy-makers should take this trade-off into account when 
debating whether to introduce such a tax cut.   21
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